Bibliography
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— (2006), Poesia, poetiche e storia nella riflessione dei Greci: Studi, Pisa, Giardini.
Barnes, Jonathan (2005), The Presocratic Philosophers, London, Routledge.
Campbell, David A. (ed. and transl.) (1991), Greek Lyric III: Stesichorus, Ibycus, Simonides, and Others, Cambridge-London, Harvard University Press.
Cornford, Francis M. (1952), Principium Sapientiae: The Origins of Greek Philosophical Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Coxon, Allan H. (2009), The Fragments of Parmenides: A Critical Text with Introduction and Translation, the Ancient Testimonia and a Commentary, edited with new translations by Richard McKirahan and with a new preface by Malcolm Schofield, Las Vegas, Parmenides Publishing.
Darcus, Shirley M. (1978), « The Phrēn of the Noos in Xenophanes' God », Symbolae Osloenses: Norwegian Journal of Greek and Latin Studies 53, p. 25-39.
von Fritz, Kurt (1942), « ΝΟΟΣ and Noein in the Homeric Poems », Classical Philology 38, p. 79-93.
— (1945), « Nous, Noein and Derivatives in Pre-Socratic Philosophy (Excluding Anaxagoras): Part I », Classical Philology 40/4, p. 223-242.
Furley, David (1989), « Truth as What Survives the Elenchos: An Idea in Parmenides », in Pamela Huby & Gordon Neal (eds.), The Criterion of Truth, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, p. 1-12.
Gerber, Douglas E. (1999), Greek Elegiac Poetry: From the Seventh to the Fifth Centuries B.C., Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press.
Granger, Herbert (2013), « Xenophanes’ Positive Theology and his Criticism of Greek Popular Religion », Ancient Philosophy 33, p. 235-271.
Hesiod (1966), Theogony, edited with a commentary by Martin L. West, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
— (1978), Works and Days, edited with a commentary by Martin L. West, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
— (2006), Theogony and Works and Days, edited and translated by Glenn W. Most, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press.
Huffman, Carl A. (2008), « Heraclitus' Critique of Pythagoras' Enquiry », Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 35, p. 19-47.
Lanata, Giuliana (1963), Poetica pre-platonica: Testimonianze e frammenti, Firenze, La Nuova Italia.
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Lesher, James (1981), « Perceiving and Knowing in the “Iliad” and the “Odyssey”, Phronesis 26, p. 2-24.
— (1984), « Parmenides' Critique of Thinking. The Poludēris Elenchos of Fragment 7 », Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2, p. 1-30.
— (1992), Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments, a Text and Translation with a Commentary, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
— (1999), « Early Interests in Knowledge », in Anthony A. Long (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 225-249.
McKirahan, Richard D. (2008), « Signs and Arguments in Parmenides B8 », in Patricia Curd & Daniel W. Graham (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 189-229.
Mogyoródi, Emese (2002), « Xenophanes as a Philosopher: Theology and Theodicy », in André Laks & Claire Louguet (éds.), Qu’est-ce que la philosophie présocratique ?, Villeneuve d’Ascq, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, p. 253-286.
Montiglio, Silvia (2000), « Wandering Philosophers in Classical Greece », Journal of Hellenic Studies 120, p. 86-105.
Mourelatos, Alexander P. D. (2008), « The Cloud-Astrophysics of Xenophanes and Ionian Material Monism », in Patricia Curd & Daniel W. Graham (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 134-168.
— (2008), The Route of Parmenides, Las Vegas, Parmenides Publishing.
Nagy, Gregory (1983), « Sēma and Noēsis: Some Illustrations », Arethusa 16, p. 35-55.
Nannini, Simonetta (2010), Omero: l'Autore necessario, Napoli, Liguori.
Palmer, John (2009), Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Parmenide (1999), Poema sulla natura, edizione, traduzione e commento di Giovanni Cerri, Milano, BUR.
Pellikan-Engel, Maja E. (1974), Hesiod and Parmenides: A New View on Their Cosmologies and on Parmenides’Proem, Amsterdam, A. M. Hakkert.
Pucci, Pietro (1977), Hesiod and the Language of Poetry, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.
— (2007), Inno alle Muse (Esiodo, Teogonia, 1-115). Testo, introduzione, traduzione e commento, Pisa, Serra.
Rosen, Ralph M. (1990), « Poetry and Sailing in Hesiod's Works and Days », Classical Antiquity 9/1, p. 99-113.
Rudhardt, Jean (1996), « Le préambule de la Théogonie. La vocation du poète. Le langage des Muses », in Fabienne Blaise, Pierre Judet de la Combe & Philippe Rousseau (éds.), Le métier du mythe: lectures d'Hésiode, Lille, Presses Universitaires du septentrion, p. 35-39.
Smyth, Herbert W. (1920), Greek Grammar, Boston, American Book Company.
Tarán, Leonardo (1965), Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Thalmann, William G. (1984), Conventions of Form and Thought in Early Greek Epic Poetry, Baltimore-London, The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Tor, Shaul (2011), Mortal and Divine in Early Greek Epistemology, PhD dissertation, Cambridge University.
— (2013), « Mortal and Divine in Xenophanes Epistemology », Rhizomata 1/2, p. 248-282.
Verdenius, Willem J. (1972), « Notes on the Proem of Hesiod's “Theogony” », Mnemosyne 25, p. 225-260.
Verity, Anthony & Stephen Instone (2007), Pindar: The Complete Odes, Oxford, University Press.
Warden, J. R. (1971), « The Mind of Zeus », Journal of the History of Ideas 32, p. 3-14.
Wedin, Michael V. (2014), Parmenides' Grand Deduction: A Logical Reconstruction of the Way of Truth, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
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Notes
Cf. James Lesher (1999), « Early Interests in Knowledge », in Anthony A. Long (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 227-228. As shown by Montiglio, the prominent role assigned to enquiry by early philosophers can be seen as a legacy of the correlation between wandering and acquisition of knowledge already present in the Odyssey, cf. Silvia Montiglio (2000), « Wandering Philosophers in Classical Greece », Journal of Hellenic Studies 120, p. 87-90. Pythagoras seems to have been particularly involved in the practice of historiē, at least according to Heraclitus (see DK22B129 and B40), but the nature and extent of his activity is, in fact, subject to debate. For a discussion of Heraclitus' testimony, including an analysis of the early usages of historiē, see Carl A. Huffman (2008), « Heraclitus' Critique of Pythagoras' Enquiry », Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 35, p. 19-47.
E.g. in Il.III.21-23; III.30-31; III.396-98. On this point, see Cf. Kurt von Fritz (1942), « ΝΟΟΣ and Noein in the Homeric Poems », Classical Philology 38, p. 89-90. Von Fritz's analysis of noein remains the most influential work on the topic and its main results, even after later reappraisal, are still accepted: see, for example, J. R. Warden (1971), « The Mind of Zeus », Journal of the History of Ideas 32, p. 3-6 ; James Lesher (1981), « Perceiving and Knowing in the “Iliad” and the “Odyssey” », Phronesis 26, p. 8-16 ; John Palmer (2009), Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 72.
Cf. Kurt von Fritz (1942), Classical Philology, 38, p. 89-90.
E.g. Il.IX.104-105 ; Il.IX.600 ; Od.V.88. On this point, and for further examples, see Kurt von Fritz (1942), Classical Philology, 38, p. 85 and 90.
Cf. J.R. Warden, Journal of the History of Ideas, 32 (1971), p. 5. Von Fritz specifies that, when noos means « plan », it does not indicate a ready-made plan, but rather a plan in the process of its elaboration, cf. Kurt von Fritz (1942), Classical Philology, 38, p. 83.
Od.I.3
Cf. James Lesher (1981), Phronesis, 26, p. 12 and passim.
On the relationship between noos and sēma, see Gregory Nagy (1983), « Sēma and Noēsis: Some Illustrations », Arethusa 16, p. 36-39.
Cf. h.Merc.213-14.
Cf. Il.XXIV.294, 312.
Cf. James Lesher (1981), Phronesis, 26, p. 15.
Od.XVIII.130-7.
See, for example, Archilochus (130 West) : « Often, when men are lying prostrate on the dark earth they raise them upright from their misery, and often they overturn on their backs even those whose stance was very firm. Then much misery is theirs and a man wanders about in need of livelihood and distraught in mind. » (tr. Gerber); Semonides (1.1-5 West) : «Boy, loud-thundering Zeus controls the outcome of everything there is and disposes it as he wishes. There is no intelligence among men, but we live like grazing animals, subject to what the day brings, with no knowledge of how the god will bring each thing to pass. » (tr. Gerber) ; Stesichorus (222b.207-208 PMGF) : « but the gods establish within one day a different mind. » (tr. Campbell) ; Pindar (N. 6.4-7) : « Even so, we resemble the immortals in some respects, in greatness of mind or of stature, though we do not know by day or night what finishing line destiny has marked out for us to run towards. » (tr. Verity). It is beyond the scope of this article to analyse the notion of intelligence in lyric poetry; this is, however, a topic that I intend to address in the future.
Op. 648-649 : δείξω δή τοι μέτρα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης,/ οὔτε τι ναυτιλίης σεσοφισμένος οὔτε τι νηῶν. I follow, with modifications, Most's translation in Hesiod, Theogony and Works and Days, edited and translated by Glenn W. Most, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press 2006.
Examples include poets, musicians, carpenters and helmsmen. On this point, cf. West's commentary in Hesiod, Works and Days, edited with a commentary by Martin L. West, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1978, ad loc. ; Ralph M. Rosen (1990), « Poetry and Sailing in Hesiod's Works and Days », Classical Antiquity 9/1, p. 101.
Cf. Op. 648-662.
About 65 metres long, see West in Hesiod, Works and Days, ed. West 1966, ad loc.
Op. 660-662, tr. Most. Greek text : τόσσον τοι νηῶν γε πεπείρημαι πολυγόμφων·/ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὣς ἐρέω Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο·/ Μοῦσαι γάρ μ᾽ἐδίδαξαν ἀθέσφατον ὕμνον ἀείδειν. The term ἀθέσφατος (here translated as « inconceivable ») has been variously interpreted as meaning « beyond even a god's power to express » ; « boundless » ; or « announced by the gods ». For a survey of the different readings, see Pietro Pucci (1977), Hesiod and the Language of Poetry, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 34 n. 4.
Cf. Op. 694 : μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι· καιρὸς δ᾽ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος, « Bear in mind measures: proportion is the best in all things » (tr. Most, with modifications).
Zeus' dealing with justice is announced in the proem to the Works and Days (cf. Op. 9-10). As implied at Op. 267-269, through his noos Zeus observes human conduct and thereby establishes the appropriate punishment or reward for men's behaviour.
Cf. Graziano Arrighetti (1987), Poeti, eruditi e biografi: momenti della riflessione dei Greci sulla letteratura, Pisa, Giardini, p. 49-50.
Cf. Jean Rudhardt (1996), « Le préambule de la Théogonie. La vocation du poète. Le langage des Muses », in Fabienne Blaise, Pierre Judet de la Combe & Philippe Rousseau (éds.), Le métier du mythe : lectures d'Hésiode, Lille, Presses Universitaires du septentrion, p. 35-39 ; Pietro Pucci (2007), Inno alle Muse (Esiodo, Teogonia, 1-115). Testo, introduzione, traduzione e commento, Pisa, Serra, p. 74. On the universal character of Hesiod's poetry, see also Simonetta Nannini (2010), Omero: l'Autore necessario, Napoli, Liguori, p. 44-46.
ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,/ ἴδμεν δ’ εὖτ’ ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι, « We know how to say false things similar to genuine ones, and we know, when we wish, how to proclaim true things » (tr. Most). These lines are famously difficult to interpret as regards the truth-status of Hesiodic poetry and the reference to Od.XIX.203 contained in line 27. Following Pucci's classification, the main interpretations can be thus divided (cf. Pietro Pucci (2007), Inno, p. 60-63) : 1) line 27 contains a criticism of Homeric poetry as false, in contrast to the truth of Hesiod's poems expressed at line 28 : e.g. in Willem J. Verdenius (1972), « Notes on the Proem of Hesiod's “Theogony” », Mnemosyne 25, p. 234-235 ; Graziano Arrighetti (2006), Poesia, poetiche e storia nella riflessione dei Greci: Studi, Pisa, Giardini, p. 4 and passim. 2) lines 27-28 qualify all the poetic production before Hesiod as a mixture of truth and falsehood, without specifically targeting Homer : e.g in Giuliana Lanata (1963), Poetica pre-platonica: Testimonianze e frammenti, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, p. 25 ; West (1966) in Hesiod, Theogony, edited with a commentary by Martin L. West, Oxford, Oxford University Press, ad loc. 3) in these lines Hesiod recognizes that all poetry, including his own, is essentially a mixture of truth and falsity : e.g. in Pietro Pucci (1997), Hesiod, p. 8-34 ; William G. Thalmann (1984), Conventions of Form and Thought in Early Greek Epic Poetry, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 143-149 ; Grace M. Ledbetter (2003), Poetics before Plato: Interpretation and Authority in Early Greek Theories of Poetry, Princeton-Oxford, Princeton University Press, p. 40-61. As emerges from my argumentation, I tend to think that, although in Hesiod's intention, the scene of his investiture should serve to demonstrate his authority and thereby the reliability of his song, the Muses' words inevitably leave the poet and his audience in a state of unsolvable uncertainty concerning the truth-status of the poem. On the Muses' ambiguity, see further Shaul Tor (2011), Mortal and Divine in Early Greek Epistemology, PhD dissertation, Cambridge University, p. 38-40.
Op. 483-484.
Op. 663-669. On this point, see further Shaul Tor (2011), Mortal and Divine, p. 43-45.
Cf. B34.1-2 : « And of course the clear and certain truth no man has seen nor will there be anyone who knows about the gods and what I say about all things ». I follow here Lesher's translation in James Lesher (1992), Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments, a Text and Translation with a Commentary, Toronto, University of Toronto Press. On the interpretation of «all things» as referring to natural phenomena, see James Lesher (1992), Xenophanes, p. 167-168.
Cf. B34.3-4 : « For even if, in the best case, one happened to speak just of what has been brought to pass, still he would not know. But opinion is wrought over all » (tr. Lesher, with modifications).
For an overview of the possible readings, see James Lesher (1992), Xenophanes, p. 159-167.
Cf. James Lesher (1992), Xenophanes, p. 166.
Cf. fragments B18, discussed below, and B26. Noticeably, the limitedness of human life will be mentioned by Protagoras as one of the reasons of his ignorance about divine nature (cf. DK80B4).
DK21B18, tr. Lesher. Greek text: οὔ τοι ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ᾽ ὑπέδειξαν,/ ἀλλὰ χρόνωι ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον.
Cf. Shaul Tor (2013), « Mortal and Divine in Xenophanes Epistemology », Rhizomata 1/2, p. 250 and passim.
Cf. Shaul Tor, Rhizomata, 1/2 (2013), p. 267. Tor presents also a restricted version of his interpretation, according to which the divine brings particular things to the consideration of mortals and only in some circumstances, but deems the universal alternative more probable (cf. Shaul Tor, Rhizomata, 1/2 (2013), p. 270-271).
The vexed question concerning Xenophanes' monotheism does not directly affect my argument, but I think that Xenophanes admitted the existence of a plurality of divine beings, as implied by the references to « gods » (in the plural) in his fragments. For a good survey of the possible interpretations, see James Lesher (1992), Xenophanes, p. 96-100. Barnes provides the reconstruction of an argument for monotheism, see Jonathan Barnes (2005), The Presocratic Philosophers, London, Routledge, p. 69-71. For a polytheistic reading, see also Herbert Granger (2013), « Xenophanes’ Positive Theology and his Criticism of Greek Popular Religion », Ancient Philosophy 33, p. 237-238.
On this point, see Kurt von Fritz (1945), « Nous, Noein and Derivatives in Pre-Socratic Philosophy (Excluding Anaxagoras): Part I », Classical Philology 40/4, p. 230.
For noēma as here equivalent to noos, see James Lesher (1992), Xenophanes, p. 97.
Cf. B24 : « Whole he sees, whole he hears, whole he thinks» (tr. Lesher). Given the complete dissimilarity of god's body from that of human beings, the fragment seems to imply that the greatest god does not possess human-like sensory organs which could limit his cognitive capacities (cf. James Lesher (1992), Xenophanes, p. 105 ; Herbert Granger, Ancient Philosophy, 33 (2013), p. 247-248). On the question of god's alleged incorporeality, see James Lesher (1992), Xenophanes, p. 100.
DK21B25, tr. Lesher. Greek text : ἀλλ᾽ ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει. On the relationship between divine noos and phrēn, see Shirley M. Darcus (1978), « The phrēn of the noos in Xenophanes' god », Symbolae Osloenses: Norwegian Journal of Greek and Latin Studies 53, p. 26.
Cf. Shaul Tor (2013), Rhizomata, 1/2, p. 268.
Hom. Il. 1.523-527. On this passage and its relationship with Xenophanes' fragment, see Hemese Mogyoródi (2002), « Xenophanes as a Philosopher: Theology and Theodicy », in André Laks & Claire Louguet (éds.), Qu’est-ce que la philosophie présocratique ?, Villeneuve d’Ascq, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, p. 283, n. 140. On the idea that kradainein includes the notion of purposeful intervention, see Shaul Tor (2013), Rhizomata, 1/2, p. 268 ; John Palmer (2009), Parmenides, p. 329 ; James Lesher (1992), Xenophanes, p. 107-109 ; Kurt von Fritz (1945), Classical Philology, 40/4, p. 229-230. For a criticism, see Herbert Grainger (2013), Ancient Philosophy, 33, p. 256-257 ; Francis M. Cornford (1952), Principium Sapientiae: The Origins of Greek Philosophical Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 147.
Cf. supra, n. 14. Mourelatos, in his reconstruction of Xenophanes' physics, argues that kradainein actually indicates the physical processes underwent by clouds which produce celestial bodies (cf. Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, (2008), « The Cloud-Astrophysics of Xenophanes and Ionian Material Monism », in Patricia Curd & Daniel W. Graham (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 156).
Cf. B26 : « Always he abides in the same state, not moving at all, nor it is fitting for him to move to different places at different times » (tr. Lesher, with modifications). For a commentary, see James Lesher (1992), Xenophanes, p. 111-114.
Tr. Lesher.
Cf. Tor's reading of the fragment in support of his «universal disclosure» hypothesis (see Shaul Tor (2013), Rhizomata, 1/2, p. 265-267).
« Unmoved » translates the Greek ἀτρεμὲς. The variant ἀτρεκές (« strict »,« sure »,« certain ») could work here, but ἀτρεμὲς is more appropriate as a qualifier of ētor, especially because it stresses the property of being unmoved by contrast with the inherent movement of the heart. On this point, cf. Leonardo Tarán (1965), Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays, Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 16-17. Alexander P. D. Mourelatos (2008), The Route of Parmenides, Las Vegas, Parmenides Publishing, p. 155-156; Allan H. Coxon (2009), The Fragments of Parmenides: A Critical Text with Introduction and Translation, the Ancient Testimonia and a Commentary, edited with new translations by Richard McKirahan and with a new preface by Malcolm Schofield, Las Vegas, Parmenides Publishing, p. 284.
Besides εὐπειθέος (« persuasive »), there are two other variants in the text, namely εὐκυκλέος («well-rounded ») accepted in the Diels-Kranz edition and εὐφεγγέος (« brilliant »), reported by Proclus, but generally dismissed by scholars. εὐκυκλέος is accepted as a lectio difficilior, but εὐπειθέος fits more in the context, as it marks a contrast with mortals' beliefs mentioned in the following line, deprived of true trustworthiness. In addition, even though in fragment B8 What-Is is compared to a sphere, at this point of the poem such an anticipation would have been missed by the audience (cf. Allan H. Coxon (2009), Fragments, p. 283-284). For a different interpretation, see Leonardo Tarán (1965), Parmenides, p. 16-17.
DK28B1.28-30, tr. Coxon, with modification. Greek text : χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι/ ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ/ ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.
As will emerge later in the poem, the « heart of truth» is not distinguished by truth itself. On this point, see also Allan H. Coxon (2009), Fragments, p. 283, in which the use of ētor is compared to that of kara and kephalē in tragedy.
On this point, see also Maja E. Pellikaan-Engels (1974), Hesiod and Parmenides: a New View on Their Cosmologies and on Parmenides’Proem, Amsterdam, A. M. Hakkert, p. 80. On ēmen...ēde, see Herbert Smyth (1920), Greek Grammar, Boston, American Book Company, n. 2867.
DK B8.50-51 : « Therewith I put a stop for you to my reliable discourse and thought about truth » (tr. Coxon, with modifications).
DK28B2.2 : ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι.
Cf. Alexander P. D. Mourelatos (2008), Route, p. 55-56, n. 26.
The translation of B2.3 and B2.5 is after Coxon's.
Cf. B2.7-8 : « For you can neither know what is not (for it is impossible) nor tell of it » (tr. Coxon).
Cf. B8.1-4 : « Only one story of the way is still left: that is. On this way there are very many signs that Being is ungenerated and imperishable, entire, unique, unmoved and perfect » (tr. Coxon, with modifications). The translation «perfect» follows an emendation of the Greek atelestos (« unaccomplished », « endless ») of the manuscripts. On this point, see Leonardo Tarán (1965), Parmenides, p. 93-95 ; Allan H. Coxon (2009), Fragments, p. 315 ; and Cerri's commentary in Parmenide, Poema sulla natura, edizione, traduzione e commento di Giovanni Cerri, Milano, BUR 1999, p. 222-223.
Cf. Richard D. McKirahan (2008), « Signs and Arguments in Parmenides B8 », in Patricia Curd & Daniel W. Graham (eds.), Handbook, p. 221, n. 9.
The correlation of asserting with thinking and knowing is stated in fragments B2.7-8; B3; B6.1-2; B8.7-9, 15-18, 50 (on this point, see Coxon 2009, p. 294). In Wedin's reconstruction of Parmenides' arguments, B2 and B3 together contain the « Governing Deduction », upon which all the other deductions are based (cf. Michael V. Wedin (2014), Parmenides' Grand Deduction: A Logical Reconstruction of the Way of Truth, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 9-33). It is beyond the scope of the present work to enter the details of Parmenides' arguments in B2 and B8. For a detailed analysis, I refer the reader to Michael Wedin (2014), Parmenides' Deduction, p. 9-33 and 83-192 ; Richard McKirahan (2008), « Signs », p. 192-221 ; John Palmer (2009), Parmenides, p. 137-159 ; Jonathan Barnes (2005), Presocratics, p. 122-136 (focused on B2).
B8.50-51 : λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης.
On this point, see also John Palmer (2009), Parmenides, p. 90.
This holds even if we interpret helenchos as referring to the decision about the right path of enquiry, since the choice is made on the basis of logical inference as well (on this point, see Alexander Mourelatos (2008), Route, p. 91; Leonardo Tarán (1965), Parmenides, p. 81). On helenchos as a test for truth, see further David Furley (1989), « Truth as What Survives the Elenchos: An Idea in Parmenides », in Pamela Huby & Gordon Neal (eds.), The Criterion of Truth, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, p. 1-12 ; for a detailed discussion of the passage, see James Lesher (1984), « Parmenides' Critique of Thinking. The Poludēris Elenchos of Fragment 7 », Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2, p. 1-30.
Cf. B8.14, 16, 30, 32, 37.
Cf. B8.60-1 : « This arrangement [i.e. mortals' doxastic account of the world] I declare to you to be plausible in its entirety in such a way that never shall any mortal opinion outstrip you » (tr. Coxon, with modifications).
Cf. B6.4-9.
B6.7. On the importance of krisis for Parmenides' epistemology, see Shaul Tor (2011), Mortal and Divine, p. 151-153.
Cf. B7 : « For this principle shall never be vanquished, so as to allow things to be that are not. But do you keep your thought from this way of enquiry. And let not habit do violence to you on the empirical way of exercising an unseeing eye and a noisy ear and tongue, but decide by reason (logos) the controversial test enjoined by me » (tr. Coxon).
Cf. B8.15-17 : « And the decision regarding these things depends on that of the issue, is or is not. Now it has been decided, as was necessary, to leave the one way unconceived and nameless, since it is not a real way, and for the other to be a way and authentic » (tr. Coxon). Noticeably, in fragment B7 the recourse to logos is emphatically opposed to the aimless wandering of the senses.
Cf. B3, B6.1-2, B8.34-38.
For an overview of the issues posed by the fragments, see Shaul Tor (2011), Mortal and Divine, p. 164-166.
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